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ATTILA AMBRUS
This paper investigates how groups or coalitions of players can act in their
collective interest in noncooperative normal form games even if equilibrium play
is not assumed. The main idea is that each member of a coalition will conﬁne play
to a subset of their strategies if it is in their mutual interest to do so. An iterative
procedure of restrictions is used to deﬁne a noncooperative solution concept, the
set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies. The procedure is analogous to itera-
tive deletion of never best response strategies, but operates on implicit agree-
ments by different coalitions. The solution set is a nonempty subset of the ratio-
nalizable strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The main solution concept in noncooperative game theory,
Nash equilibrium, requires stability only with respect to individ-
ual deviations by players. It does not take into account the pos-
sibility that groups of players might coordinate their moves, in
order to achieve an outcome that is better for all of them. There
have been several attempts to incorporate this consideration into
the theory of noncooperative games, starting with the pioneering
work of Schelling [1960] and Aumann [1959]. The latter offered
strong Nash equilibrium, the ﬁrst formal solution concept in
noncooperative game theory that takes into account the interests
of coalitions. More recently, Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston
[1987] proposed coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. This concept
has since been used to derive predictions in a wide range of
economic models. Examples include menu auctions [Bernheim
and Whinston 1986], dynamic public good provision games
[Chakravorti 1995], bankruptcy rules [Dagan, Serrano, and Volij
1997], principal-agent games [Gupta and Romano 1998], corpo-
rate takeovers [Noe 1998], common agency games [Konishi, Le-
Breton, and Weber 1999], and oligopoly competition [Delgado and
Moreno 2004].
However, all of the concepts introduced so far are not being
able to guarantee the existence of a solution in a natural class of
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903games. This casts doubt on the validity of the solution they
provide even in games in which a solution exists. Nonexistence is
especially severe in the case of strong Nash equilibrium. Coali-
tion-proof Nash equilibrium exists in a larger set of games, but at
the cost of imposing debatable restrictions on which coalitions of
players can make agreements with each other, and even so it
cannot get around the nonexistence issue.
This paper proposes a new solution concept, coalitional ra-
tionalizability, to address the issue of coalitional agreements.
Attention is restricted to normal-form games, although the prin-
ciples proposed here can be applied to more general settings. Both
a direct and a procedural deﬁnition for the solution set is pro-
vided. The latter is particularly easy to use. To obtain the set of
coalitionally rationalizable strategies in any game, one can just
use a simple iterative procedure.
The main conceptual innovation is that I depart from the
usual equilibrium setting and present a nonequilibrium theory,
like rationalizability [Bernheim 1984; Pearce 1984]. The coali-
tional agreements players can consider in this context take the
form of restrictions of the strategy space. This means that players
look for agreements to avoid certain strategies, without specify-
ing play within the set of nonexcluded strategies. These agree-
ments are more general than the ones that uniquely pin down a
strategy proﬁle for a coalition.
A restriction is supported if every group member always (for
every possible expectation) expects a higher payoff if the agree-
ment is made than if he instead chooses to play a strategy outside
the agreement. If conjectures are associated with the payoffs that
best response strategies to these conjectures yield, then the above
requirement means that players in the group prefer any conjec-
ture compatible with the agreement to any for which a strategy
outside the agreement is a best response.
The construction assumes that players go through the follow-
ing reasoning. First, every coalition of players looks for supported
restrictions given the set of all strategies. Then players consider
the set of strategy proﬁles that are consistent with all the above
restrictions (their conjectures are restricted to be concentrated on
these strategies) and look for further restrictions, given this
smaller set of strategies. They continue this procedure and re-
strict the set of strategies further and further, until they reach a
point at which there is no supported restriction by any coalition
given the set of strategies that survived the procedure so far. This
904 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSprocedure is analogous to iterative deletion of never best response
strategies in that the order of restrictions does not matter. Fur-
thermore, it deletes all strategies that the latter procedure elimi-
nates. The new feature is that groups of players, as opposed to
just individual players, can delete strategies.
The set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies is the set of
proﬁles that survive the above procedure of iterated supported
restrictions by coalitions.
The interpretation of the solution concept is that it is the set
of outcomes which are compatible with the reasoning procedure
reﬂected by the iterative procedure of supported restrictions. The
latter restrictions come from introspection, based on the publicly
known payoffs of the game. They reﬂect implicit agreements
among players. In particular, they have to be self-enforcing: if a
player believes that all others play according to a supported
restriction, then it is strictly in her interest to play according to it.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II provides two
simple examples to provide intuition on the logic of coalitional
restrictions. The examples show that coalitional reasoning can
lead to sharp predictions in certain games even when players’
expectations are not assumed to be correct. In the ﬁrst example it
leads to an equilibrium proﬁle (so the correctness of expectations
is established as a result, as opposed to being assumed in the ﬁrst
place), while in the second one it signiﬁcantly reduces the set of
possible outcomes. Section III provides the formal construction of
the theory, deﬁning supported restrictions and the iterative pro-
cedure that obtains the solution set. It also contains the main
results of the paper, establishing various properties of the itera-
tive procedure and the solution set. Sections IV and V relate the
solution set to other noncooperative solution concepts and exam-
ine connections with Pareto efﬁciency.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
This section provides examples on how coalitional reasoning
can help players narrow down the set of possibilities they should
consider, and to coordinate their action choices.
II.A. Voting with Costly Participation
Consider the following voting game. There are three poten-
tial voters and three possible outcomes. Assume that there is a
status quo outcome S and that it can be changed only if at least
905 COALITIONAL RATIONALIZABILITYtwo of the voters show up and vote for the same new alternative.
There are two potential new alternatives to vote for, A and B.
Showing up and casting a vote costs ε  (0,1). Voters rank the
possible outcomes the following way. Voter 1’s favorite outcome is
A, then B, and then S. Voter 2’s favorite outcome is A, then S,
and then B. Finally, voter 3’s favorite outcome is B, then S, and
then A. Assume that for every voter her favorite outcome yields a
payoff of 2, her second favorite outcome yields 1, and her least
favorite outcome has 0 (minus ε in each case if she showed up to
vote). This game has multiple equilibria, and in fact for all three
outcomes in the game there is some Nash equilibrium that yields
that outcome. In one equilibrium all three voters stay at home,
and the status quo outcome prevails. In another equilibrium
voters 1 and 3 show up and vote for outcome B, while voter 2
stays home. And in yet another equilibrium voters 1 and 2 show
up and vote for outcome A, while voter 3 stays at home. The above
equilibria are not Pareto-ranked (note that each voter has a
distinct least favorite outcome, so in any equilibrium someone’s
least favorite outcome is chosen). On the other hand, the follow-
ing reasoning procedure selects a unique equilibrium in the
game.
First, note that it is never rational (it is strictly dominated)
for voter 3 to show up and vote for alternative A, since voting is
costly and A is her least preferred outcome. Given that, the best
possible outcome in the game for voters 1 and 2 is if they show up
and vote for A. Although this point is fairly straightforward, let
us make it more rigorous, to demonstrate the logic of supported
restrictions that I formally deﬁne in the next section. Fix any
conjecture concerning player 3’s strategy that allocates zero prob-
ability to player 3 voting for A. Then the following are true. If
players 1 and 2 both show up and vote for A, they expect a payoff
of 2  ε for sure. If player 1 shows up and votes for B, her
expected payoff cannot be higher than 1  ε. If player 1 stays at
home, her expected payoff cannot be higher than 1. The same are
true for player 2, also (with the addition that voting for B is not
even rational for her). Therefore, for any possible conjecture con-
cerning player 3’s strategy, both player 1 and player 2 are strictly
better off coordinating on playing A than not coordinating and
playing some other strategy. Completing the argument, if player
1 and player 2 act accordingly, then outcome A is indeed imple-
mented, no matter whether player 3 stays at home or shows up
906 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSand votes for B. Given this, voter 3 should conclude that she is
better off staying at home and not voting.
II.B. Dollar Division Game with External Reward
The second example demonstrates that even when coalitional
reasoning does not lead to a unique prediction in a game, it can
considerably narrow down the set of possible outcomes. Consider
a classic dollar division game with the additional twist that
players receive an external reward in the event that players
behave “nicely.” Concretely, three players vote secretly and si-
multaneously on how to divide a dollar. If two or more players
vote for the same allocation, the dollar is divided accordingly;
otherwise the dollar is lost to the players. The added element is
that if every player votes for allocations that would give all
players in the game at least a quarter of a dollar, then every
player gets an additional $100 reward for the group being “gen-
erous,” independently of what happens to the original dollar (in
particular, even in the event that it is not allocated to the players
because of lack of agreement).
1 In this game coordinating on
voting for allocations that give at least 1/4 dollar to every player
is unambiguously mutually advantageous for the players. It is not
clear how the original dollar should be divided, or whether it is
reasonable to expect two or more players to vote for the same
division, and if yes, then which players vote for the winning
allocation. There is a conﬂict of interest among players regarding
how to allocate the “last quarter,” but they have a strong incen-
tive to propose at least 1/4 dollar to every player, since the
external reward is much bigger than the stake that is to be
divided. Players who coordinate along the line of common interest
therefore should expect each other to propose allocations
(x1,x2,x3) such that xi  1/4, @i  {1,2,3}, even if they are
uncertain about exactly what allocations the others propose. It is
worth pointing out that coalition-proof Nash equilibrium does not
exist and therefore does not give any prediction in this game.
2
1. This game can be interpreted as a simple model of the following situation.
Several political parties in a postwar country trying to form a coalitional govern-
ment, and an international organization makes a credible promise to provide a
large amount of ﬁnancial aid to the country if during the negotiations parties do
not try to squeeze out any of the participants from power.
2. Section IV discusses the relationship between coalitional rationalizability
and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in detail, and brieﬂy revisits this game.
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III.A. Notation and Basic Deﬁnitions
Let G  (I,S,u) be a normal form game, where I  { 1 ,...,n }
is the set of players, S 
iISi, is the set of strategies, and
u 
iIui, ui:S 3 R,  i  I are the payoff functions. Assume
that Si is ﬁnite for every i  I. Let Si 
jI/iSj,  i  I, and let
SJ 
jI/JSj,  J  I. Similarly, for a generic s  S, let si 

jI/isj,  i  I, and let sJ 
jI/Jsj,  J  I. I will refer to non-
empty groups of players (J such that J  I and J  A)a s
coalitions.
I assume that players are Bayesian decision makers and that
they can form correlated conjectures concerning other players’
moves. Given the latter assumption, a strategy is a never best
response if and only if it is strictly dominated (by a mixed strat-
egy).
3 Therefore, from this point on I use these terms interchange-
ably. Requiring conjectures to be independent (to be product
probability distributions over the strategy space) does not change
the qualitative results in the paper.
Let i be the set of probability distributions over Si,
representing the set of possible conjectures player i can have
concerning other players’ moves. For every J  I, i  J and fi 
i, let f i
J be the marginal distribution of fi over SJ.
The construction involves comparing expectations of play-
ers under different conjectures. For every fi  i and si  Si,
let ui(si, fi)  ¥ti:tiSi ui(si,ti)  fi(ti) denote the ex-
pected payoff of player i if he has conjecture fi and plays pure
strategy si.
Since players are Bayesian decision makers, the concept of
best response plays a central role in what follows. For every fi 
i, let BRi( fi)  {sisi  Si, ui(si,fi)  ui(ti,fi), @ti  Si},
the set of pure strategy best responses player i has against
conjecture fi. For any B  S such that B  A and
B  
iIBi, let * i(Bi)  { fifi  i, ?bi  Bi such that
bi  BRi( fi)}. In words, * i(Bi) is the set of beliefs that player
i has against which there is a best response in Bi.
Let u ˆ i( fi)  ui(bi,fi) for any bi  BRi( fi). Then u ˆ i( fi)
is the expected payoff of a player if he has conjecture fi and plays
3. For the proof of this well-known result, see, for instance, Fudenberg and
Tirole [1992, pp. 52–53].
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expected payoff of a rational player if he has conjecture fi.
I will consider restrictions on the supports of players’ conjec-
tures. These restrictions are required to be product sets. For any
A such that A  S and A  
iIAi, let i(A)  { fisuppfi 
Ai}, the set of conjectures player i can have that are concen-
trated on Ai (the set of conjectures that are consistent with
player i believing that other players play inside A).
Certain product subsets of the strategy space play an impor-
tant role in the construction below. These are sets that satisfy
that whenever a player believes that others play inside the set
then all her best responses are inside the set. Following standard
terminology, I call these sets closed under rational behavior.
4
DEFINITION. Set A is closed under rational behavior if it satisﬁes
the following two properties:
	*
A  
iI
Ai and Ai  Si,  i  I
	**
 BRi	 fi
  Ai,  fi  i	A
,  i  I.
Let M denote the collection of sets closed under rational
behavior.
I assume that players coordinate on restricting their play to
a subset of the strategy space whenever by doing so each of them
is guaranteed to get an expected payoff that is strictly higher
than any expected payoff he could get if the restriction was not
made and he played a strategy outside the restriction. These
restrictions, called supported restrictions, constitute the main
building block of the construction that follows.
Let A and B be such that A  S, A  
iIAi,B C, B 

iI Bi and B  A.
DEFINITION. B is a supported restriction by J given A if it satisﬁes
the following two properties:
(1) Bi  Ai,  i  J
(2)  j  J, fj  * j	Aj/Bj
  j	A

it is the case that
u ˆ j	fj
  u ˆ j	gj
  gj  j	B
 such that gj
J  f j
J.
4. The term was introduced by Basu and Weibull [1991].
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given A. Let A n B denote A nJ B for some J  I, J  A.
Supported restrictions are deﬁned given a nonempty product
subset of the strategy space. The motivation is that players are
certain that play is inside this set.
5 Note that the set is allowed to
be the set of all strategies. The ﬁrst condition in the above deﬁ-
nition requires that only the strategies of those players who are
members of the given group be restricted. The second condition
requires that for any player in the coalition, any belief to which he
has a best response strategy outside the agreement yields a
strictly lower expected payoff than any belief that is consistent
with other players in the coalition keeping the agreement, hold-
ing the marginal expectation concerning the strategies of players
outside the coalition ﬁxed.
Intuitively, this deﬁnition considers the possible expected
payoffs of a player if he chose to play a strategy to be excluded by
the agreement, and compares them with payoffs he could expect
if the restriction is made (if all the other players in the coalition
conﬁned their play to the restriction). Arguably, this is the most
natural payoff comparison to use in deciding whether it is in the
interest of a player to agree upon not playing the strategies to be
excluded by a restriction. A restriction is then called supported if
the expected payoffs that are compatible with the agreement
strictly Pareto dominate those that are associated with playing
strategies outside the restriction, for any ﬁxed conjecture con-
cerning players’ strategies outside the coalition. In short, a re-
striction is supported if every coalition member prefers the agree-
ment to playing a strategy outside the agreement, for every
possible conjecture that he can have associated with the above
two scenarios.
The reason marginal conjectures concerning the play of play-
ers outside the coalition are ﬁxed is that since players make their
moves secretly, the strategy choice of players outside the coalition
cannot be made contingent on whether players in the coalition
play inside B. The other players, after going through whatever
mental procedure they use to formulate beliefs, may or may not
believe that members of the coalition play according to the re-
striction. The point is that they do not have a chance to ﬁnd this
out. Note, however, that, as discussed above, the payoff compari-
5. For a rigorous formalization of this idea, see Ambrus [2005], where coali-
tional rationalizability is introduced in an epistemic framework.
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cerning the play of players outside the coalition.
Besides its intuitive appeal, the deﬁnition above has the
advantage that supported restrictions satisfy two desirable prop-
erties. One is that the concept is a generalization of eliminating
never best response strategies by individual players (see Propo-
sition 4 below), which ensures that a theory built on it is consis-
tent with individual rationality. This property does not hold for
deﬁnitions that are not based on comparing expected payoffs, for
example if it is only required that for every player in the coalition
every payoff within the restriction is strictly higher than every
payoff outside the restriction. The second is that supported re-
strictions are self-enforcing. Note that the second condition in the
above deﬁnition cannot hold if there is a player j in J and a
conjecture fj which is concentrated on Bj and against which j
has a best response in Aj/Bj. This implies that if A is closed
under rational behavior and A is a supported restriction given B,
then B is also closed under rational behavior. If a player believes
that the others play according to a supported restriction, then it
is in his best interest to play according to the restriction too.
Nevertheless, comparing sets of payoffs is a far from obvious
exercise, therefore one might want to consider alternative deﬁni-
tions to supported restriction. I do not take up that task here and
instead refer the interested reader to Ambrus [2005].
III.B. The Set of Coalitionally Rationalizable Strategies and its
Basic Properties
The construction below refers to sets that are closed under
rational behavior and have the property that every strategy in
the set is a best response to some conjecture concentrated on the
set. I call these sets coherent.
6
DEFINITION. Set A is coherent if it is closed under rational behav-
ior and satisﬁes
(3) 
fii	A

BRi	 fi
  Ai,  i  I.
6. The terminology reﬂects that these sets satisfy the coherence requirement
of Gul [1996] in that the strategies of a player that are inside the given set are
implied by the restriction that other players play inside the set and that allowable
beliefs about other players should include the convex hull of action proﬁles in the
restriction. Investigating sets of strategies satisfying this type of requirement was
ﬁrst undertaken by Bernheim [1984] and Pearce [1984]. Basu and Weibull [1991]
call these sets strictly closed under rational behavior.
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restrictions. Starting from the set of all strategies, in each step
the intersection of all supported restrictions is retained. Below, it
is shown that supported restrictions are compatible with each
other in the sense that taking the intersection of all supported
restrictions at any step of the procedure results in a nonempty set
of strategies. This holds despite the fact that a player is part of
many different coalitions and those coalitions may have different
supported restrictions.
The procedure deﬁned above can be thought of as a descrip-
tive theory of belief formation. Players, based on the strategies
and payoff functions of the game, look for supported restrictions
given the set of all strategies. This means that at the beginning of
the procedure they consider any strategy proﬁle to be possible to
be played. If such restrictions are found, then they expect the
players in the corresponding coalitions to play inside the restric-
tions (to successfully coordinate their moves to play inside the
restrictions). This requirement restricts the set of possible beliefs
they can have. Then they look for supported restrictions with
respect to the new, restricted set of possible beliefs. If such re-
strictions are found, then they expect players in the correspond-
ing coalitions to play inside the restrictions, and so on, until the
set of possible beliefs cannot be constrained any further. No other
beliefs can be ruled out conﬁdently based only on the information
summarized in the payoff functions. I emphasize that, in the
above interpretation, players do not explicitly make agreements
with each other. They simply go through a reasoning procedure
based on the commonly known payoff structure of the game and
formulate their beliefs concerning the others’ play according to
this procedure. Explicit agreements would require preplay com-
munication among players, which is not considered here.
For every A  M let F (A) denote the collection of all
supported restrictions given A.
DEFINITION. Let A
0  S. For every k  1 let Ak  
BF 	 Ak1
B.
Let A*  
k0,1,2,...A
k.
The following two properties are useful in establishing one of
the main results in the paper, nonemptiness of A*. Proposition 1
establishes that the intersection of all supported restrictions
given a set that is closed under rational behavior is nonempty.
Proposition 2 establishes that if B is a supported restriction given
912 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSA and A is closed under rational behavior, then B remains a
supported restriction given any set that is obtained from A by a
sequence of supported restrictions. This property guarantees the
internal consistency of the iterative procedure of supported re-
strictions, the main step in establishing that the order in which
restrictions are made is inconsequential in this iterative proce-
dure (see Proposition 5 below).
PROPOSITION 1. Let A  M. Then 
B:BF 	 A
B  A.
PROPOSITION 2. Let A  M. Assume that A nJ
B B. Let C
0,...,
C
k(k  1) be such that C
0  A and C
i nJ
i C
i1, @i 
1 ,...,k. Then C
k nJ
B (B  C
k).
All formal proofs are in the Appendix. The important insight
in establishing Proposition 1 is that for every player the strate-
gies that are best responses for this player for her most optimistic
conjecture (the one that yields the highest expected payoff) con-
centrated on A have to be included in every supported restriction
by every coalition that this player is a member of. This follows
from the deﬁnition of a supported restriction. For proving Propo-
sition 2, the key step is showing that given a set that is closed
under rational behavior, the intersection of two supported restric-
tions by the same coalition is a supported restriction itself, by the
same coalition (and therefore, by Proposition 1, nonempty).
Proposition 3, a central result in this section, establishes that
the iterative procedure of supported restrictions stops in a ﬁnite
number of steps, and the set it obtains is nonempty, closed under
rational behavior and has the property that, given this set, no
coalition has a nontrivial supported restriction. The key step in
proving this is showing, using Propositions 1 and 2, that A
k is
nonempty and closed under rational behavior for every k. The
ﬁniteness of the game then implies all the claims in the
proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. A* satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) nonempty
(ii) closed under rational behavior
(iii) A* n B implies B  A*
(iv) ?K such that A
k  A* whenever k  K.
Although the iterative procedure is deﬁned on pure strate-
gies, allowing players to use mixed strategies would lead to the
same pure strategies and some (not necessarily all) of the mixed
913 COALITIONAL RATIONALIZABILITYstrategies with the same support. For more on this, see subsec-
tion VI.C.
To obtain some other properties of A*, it is useful to identify
supported restrictions by singleton coalitions. Proposition 4 es-
tablishes that these restrictions are equivalent to elimination of
never best-response strategies.
PROPOSITION 4. Let A  M and i  I. Then A n{i} B iff B  Bi 
Ai, Bi  Ai and si  Bi/Ai implies that ?fi  i(A)
such that si  BRi( fi).
Proposition 3 implies that, in particular, there is no sup-
ported restriction by any single-player coalition given A*. Propo-
sition 4 then implies that A* satisﬁes (3). Furthermore, Proposi-
tion 3 establishes that A*  M. Combining these results estab-
lishes that A* is coherent. This immediately implies that A*i s
contained in the set of rationalizable strategies, since the latter is
the largest coherent set (see Bernheim [1984]).
A* is deﬁned to be the set obtained by a particular iterative
procedure that requires supported restrictions to be made in a
particular order, namely making all possible generalized sup-
ported restrictions simultaneously at every step. The next claim
establishes that the particular order of restrictions does not mat-
ter. Any iterative procedure that makes some nontrivial sup-
ported restriction whenever one exists (for example, just making
one restriction at a time, in any possible order) would yield the
same solution set, A*. This result is essentially a consequence of
the one in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 5. Let B
0  S. If there is no nontrivial supported
restriction given B
0, then let B
1  B
0. Otherwise, let 
0 be
a nonempty collection of nontrivial supported restrictions
from B
0, and let B1  
B:B0B. In a similar fashion once B
k
is deﬁned for some k  1, let B
k1  B
k if there is no
nontrivial supported restriction given B
k. Otherwise, let 
k
be a nonempty collection of nontrivial supported restrictions
given B
k, and let B
k1  
B:BkB. Then there is L  0 such
that B
k  A*, @k  L.
The last proposition of this section shows that the set of
coalitionally rationalizable strategies is stable with respect to
supported restrictions given any superset, and using this prop-
erty gives a direct deﬁnition of the set.
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iI Ai  A and A  S.
DEFINITION. A is externally coalitionally stable if for every C  A
such that A  C it is the case that A 
B:BF 	C
B and
C  
B:BF 	C
B.
DEFINITION. A is internally coalitionally stable if A n B implies
that B  A.
DEFINITION. A is coalitionally stable if it is both externally and
internally coalitionally stable.
Intuitively, coalitional stability of A requires that whenever
one starts out from a set larger than A, supported restrictions
restrict that set “toward A,” while A itself cannot be restricted
further.
PROPOSITION 6. A* is the only coalitionally stable set in G.
The proof generalizes the arguments behind Proposition 2
and shows that (i) A* is coalitionally stable; (ii) for any set A
which is such that A/A* is nonempty there is a superset of A
given which there is a supported restriction that does not include
A/A*, implying that these sets cannot be coalitionally stable.
IV. RELATING COALITIONAL RATIONALIZABILITY
TO OTHER SOLUTION CONCEPTS
I examine the connections between the set of coalitionally
rationalizable strategies and some standard noncooperative solu-
tion concepts. These are Nash equilibrium, and the two most
commonly used noncooperative coalitional equilibrium concepts:
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and strong Nash equilibrium.
IV.A. Nash Equilibrium
The set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies is not an
equilibrium concept, so it is not surprising that it is not contained
in the set of Nash-equilibrium outcomes (the outcomes that can
be realizations of some mixed strategy Nash equilibrium). Con-
sider the game of Figure I.
The only Nash equilibrium of the game is (A2,B2). Never-
theless, the set of coalitionally rationalizable proﬁles is the whole
game. For all other strategy proﬁles the sum of payoffs is nega-
tive. Still, if conjectures do not have to be correct, then other
915 COALITIONAL RATIONALIZABILITYstrategies can be played since players can expect positive payoffs
in the negative-sum matching pennies game {A1,A3}  {B1,B3}.
Furthermore, as seen in previous examples, the set of Nash
equilibria is not contained in the set of coalitionally rationalizable
strategies. However, it is straightforward to show that there is
always at least one Nash equilibrium of every game that is inside
the set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies. This is a direct
implication of the result that A* is closed under rational behav-
ior: any Nash equilibrium of the game with restricted strategy
sets A* (which as a ﬁnite normal-form game, has at least one
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies) is also a Nash equilibrium
of G.
IV.B. Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium and Strong Nash
Equilibrium
The ﬁrst question addressed here is whether there can be
nontrivial supported restrictions in games in which coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium does not exist. The next example demon-
strates that the answer is yes. Coalitional rationality can have
bite in these games, in the sense that the set of coalitionally
rationalizable strategies is strictly smaller than the set of ratio-
nalizable strategies.
The dollar division game is a classic example of a game in
which coalitional equilibrium concepts do not exist. Consider the
version of the game presented in Section II. The intuition that
players should expect each other to vote for generous allocations
so that the group can receive the external reward is captured by
coalitional rationalizability. Proposing only allocations (x1,x2,x3)
such that xi  1/4, @i  {1,2,3} is a supported restriction for the
coalition of all players given the set of all strategies, and it is the
set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies. The game does not
have any coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
FIGURE I
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with some coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is contained in the set
of coalitionally rationalizable strategies. The following example
demonstrates that the answer is no.
In the game of Figure II, (A3,B3,C3) is the unique coalition-
proof equilibrium (even allowing for mixed strategies). It is
straightforward to establish that there is no self-enforcing proﬁle
in which players only play strategies inside {A1,A2} 
{B1,B2}  {C1,C2} with positive probability, by showing that
from every such Nash equilibrium there is a two-player coalition
that can proﬁtably deviate to another Nash equilibrium.
7 Next,
observe that in any Nash equilibrium a player can only play his
third strategy with positive probability if at least one of the other
players plays his third strategy with probability 1 (otherwise, the
third strategy cannot be a best response). But then in any self-
7. In a three-player game a proﬁle is self-enforcing iff it satisﬁes the following
two properties: (i) it is a Nash equilibrium; (ii) no coalition of two players can
deviate to a proﬁle that is a Nash equilibrium in the component game induced on
them by the third player’s strategy in such a way that both of them are strictly
better off. For the general deﬁnition of self-enforcing, see Bernheim, Peleg, and
Whinston [1987].
FIGURE II
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strategies with probability 1. It is straightforward to show that
there is no self-enforcing proﬁle in which two players play their
third strategies with probability 1 and the third player does not,
because then the ﬁrst two players have a joint deviation from
which neither of them could deviate further proﬁtably. Hence, the
only candidate even in mixed strategies for a self-enforcing proﬁle
is when player 1 plays A3 with probability 1, player 2 plays B3
with probability 1, and player 3 plays C3 with probability 1.
Furthermore, it is a self-enforcing proﬁle since no single-player or
two-player coalition can have a proﬁtable deviation, and the
coalition of all three players does not have a self-enforcing devia-
tion, because there is no other self-enforcing proﬁle in the game.
Since (A3,B3,C3) is the only self-enforcing proﬁle in the game, it
is the unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, the set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies
is {A1,A2}  {B1,B2}  {C1,C2} (this is the set obtained after
the ﬁrst round of the iterative procedure at which point there is
no more nontrivial supported restriction), so (A3,B3,C3) is not
coalitionally rationalizable. In fact, the set of coalitionally ratio-
nalizable strategies and the set of coalition-proof equilibria are
disjoint sets in this game.
Note that (A3,B3,C3) is a coalition-proof equilibrium only
because the game with the set of strategies {A1,A2}  {B1,B2} 
{C1,C2} does not have a coalition-proof equilibrium. On the other
hand, all players would strictly prefer to switch play to that part
of the game no matter what happens over there (they cannot
agree upon a concrete proﬁle, but they would all agree to restrict-
ing their moves to {A1,A2}  {B1,B2}  {C1,C2}). This predic-
tion is clearly more reasonable than that players will play the
proﬁle (A3,B3,C3).
The above game could easily be made generic by some small
perturbation of the payoffs, such that the set of coalitionally
rationalizable strategies and the set of coalition-proof equilibria
remain the same. Thus, even in generic games a coalition-proof
equilibrium might not be coalitionally rationalizable.
The next proposition shows that only the nonexistence of
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in some restriction of the origi-
nal game can result in some coalition-proof Nash equilibrium not
being coalitionally rationalizable. Proposition 7 establishes that if
in every restriction of the original game there exists a coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium, then all the pure strategy coalition-proof
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able. The main argument in the proof is as follows. If a proﬁle is
not included in the set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies,
then there is k and a coalition J such that the proﬁle is included
in A
k, but there is a supported restriction B by J given A such
that the proﬁle is not included in B. Then it can be shown that
coalition J could deviate in a credible and proﬁtable manner from
the original proﬁle to any coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the
game restricted to B, contradicting that the proﬁle is a coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium itself. The result can be extended to
mixed strategy coalition-proof Nash equilibria by requiring that
every game which is obtained from the original game by ﬁxing a
mixed strategy proﬁle for some players and restricting the strat-
egies of the other players to a subset of their original strategy set
has a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
For every A  S such that A 
iI Ai  A, let G[A] 
(I,A,uA) denote the normal-form game for which uA(s)  u(s),
@s  A. It is the game obtained from G by restricting the set of
strategies to A.
PROPOSITION 7. If for every A  S such that A  x
iI Ai  A,i t
holds that G[A] has a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, then
every pure strategy coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of G is
contained in A*.
Proposition 7 and the example of Figure II illustrate that the
issue of nonexistence confounds the iteratively deﬁned solution
concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. This is not surprising
given the iterative deﬁnition of the concept. The set of coalition-
proof Nash equilibria of a game directly depends on coalition-
proof Nash equilibria of restrictions of the original game. There-
fore, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium can only be trusted to give
a reasonable prediction if it gives a reasonable prediction in every
restriction of the game (namely if it exists in every restriction). It
is unclear to me whether in the latter class of games coalition-
proof Nash equilibria give more reasonable predictions than other
Nash equilibria that lie within the set of coalitionally rationaliz-
able strategies. This is an issue I hope to return to in future work.
The section concludes by investigating relations to strong
Nash equilibria: proﬁles that satisfy that no coalition has any
proﬁtable joint deviation. The latter is a very strong stability
requirement, resulting in nonexistence of a strong Nash equilib-
919 COALITIONAL RATIONALIZABILITYrium in many games. The next proposition establishes that, un-
like coalition-proof Nash equilibria, every strong Nash equilib-
rium of every game must be contained in the set of coalitionally
rationalizable strategies. This means that there is no inherent
contradiction between supported restrictions in a nonequilibrium
setting and group deviations in an equilibrium setting. Inconsis-
tencies only arise if the set of allowable coalitional deviations are
restricted according to the deﬁnition of coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 8. Let (1,...,I) be a strong Nash equilib-
rium proﬁle. Then supp  A*.
V. PARETO EFFICIENCY
Coalitional rationalizability takes the interest of coalitions
other than the coalition of all players into account. Therefore, in
general it does not guarantee Pareto efﬁciency. There is no con-
tainment relationship between the set of coalitionally rationaliz-
able strategies and the set of Pareto undominated proﬁles, or
rationalizable proﬁles that are Pareto undominated by other ra-
tionalizable proﬁles, or Nash equilibria that are Pareto undomi-
nated by other Nash equilibria.
The fact that groups of players expect each other to pursue
common gains can make all of them worse off, as the game of
Figure III shows.
In this game the (strict) Nash equilibrium proﬁle (A1,B1,C1)
is not coalitionally rationalizable because no matter what player
3 does, playing (A2,B2) always gives the highest payoff for play-
ers 1 and 2. But then player 3 is better off playing C2, making
(A2,B2,C2) the only coalitionally rationalizable proﬁle, which is
strictly Pareto-dominated by (A1,B1,C1).
This example might seem puzzling, given that coalitional
rationalizability is built on the assumption that players try to
attain common gains. However, if not only the coalition of all
players, but also subcoalitions of players act along these lines,
then nothing guarantees Pareto efﬁciency of the resulting out-
come. The fact that coalitions cannot commit not to go for a
common gain can make them worse off. I view this as a coalitional
version of the insight that is obtained from the prisoner’s di-
lemma, where the fact that players cannot commit not to play
individually rational strategies makes both of them worse off.
920 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSAlthough in the above example Pareto inefﬁciency results from
the fact that there is a highlighted coalition that cannot commit
not to go for coalitional gains, it can be shown that inefﬁciency
can arise in perfectly symmetric games as well.
8
Pareto efﬁciency can be guaranteed only in special classes of
games. For example, it is easy to establish that in games that
have a Pareto dominant proﬁle among rationalizable strategies,
that proﬁle is the unique element in the set of coalitionally
rationalizable strategies. Also, in two-player games the support of
every Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium is contained in the
set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies. The proofs of these
claims are straightforward and therefore omitted.
VI. DISCUSSION
VI.A. Epistemic Deﬁnition
The deﬁnition of coalitional rationalizability provided in this
paper is along the lines of the original deﬁnition of rationalizabil-
ity (see Pearce [1984] and Bernheim [1984]). It is characterized by
an iterative procedure which has an intuitive interpretation:
players expect all supported restrictions to be made given the set
of all strategies, and they expect all supported restrictions to be
made given the set of strategies that are consistent with the
above requirement, and so on. The main advantage of this deﬁ-
nition, besides that it refers to an intuitive reasoning procedure,
is that it is constructive, making the set of rationalizable strate-
gies relatively easy to compute in examples and applications.
However, it does not directly reveal what primitive assumptions
8. See the previous version of the paper for an example.
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tionally rationalizable strategies. The set of rationalizable strat-
egies was subsequently shown to be equivalent to the set of
strategies compatible with rationality and common certainty of
rationality [Tan and Werlang 1988; Brandenburger and Dekel
1993], using the formalism of interactive epistemology. This
raises the question whether the set of coalitionally rationalizable
strategies has a similar interpretation. The direct characteriza-
tion of Proposition 6 is a step in this direction. I do not pursue the
issue further in this paper, instead referring the interested
reader to Ambrus [2005]. That paper provides alternative, epis-
temic deﬁnitions of coalitional rationalizability.
VI.B. Mixed Strategies
Coalitional rationalizability is a concept deﬁned on pure
strategies (with respect to the players’ actions, a player’s conjec-
ture can be any probability distribution on the other players’
strategy set). However, the construction is also valid if players
are allowed to play mixed strategies. It is straightforward to
extend the concept of supported restriction and then coalitional
rationalizability to the space of mixed strategies. One can then
show that coalitionally rationalizable mixed strategies are a sub-
set of mixed strategies whose support is inside the set of coali-
tionally rationalizable pure strategies.
9 Furthermore, they in-
clude all coalitionally rationalizable pure strategies.
VI.C. Preplay Communication
A natural issue to investigate is the interaction of preplay
communication and coalitional rationality. The particular ques-
tions that arise include whether all supported restrictions remain
credible in a context with communication among players,
whether there are new restrictions that become credible and
whether the set of solutions compatible with the theory still has
product structure. Since these issues are complicated and possi-
bly depend on the exact speciﬁcation of the rules of communica-
tion, I leave the task of formally addressing the problem of coali-
tional agreements in a framework with communication to a fu-
ture project.
Here I just note that there are reasons to believe that preplay
9. The inclusion can be strict. This is analogous to the relationship between
rationalizable pure and mixed strategies.
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players use coalitional reasoning. Coalitional rationalizability re-
quires conﬁdence that other players reason a particular way.
Preplay communication can help establish the necessary amount
of trust for the restrictions involved. Experimental game theory
provides some support for this claim. In certain coordination
games, preplay communication increases players’ propensity to
play Pareto optimal outcomes, and multisided preplay communi-
cation may increase cooperation more than one-sided communi-
cation (see Cooper et al. [1992] and Charness [2000]).
VII. RELATED LITERATURE
Section IV related coalitional rationalizability to various
equilibrium concepts. Besides the general solution concepts men-
tioned, there are several contributions in the literature that in-
corporate coalitional reasoning into the play of normal-form
games in more speciﬁc settings.
Chwe [1994], Mariotti [1997], and Xue [1998, 2000] assume
that players engage in a possibly inﬁnite negotiation procedure
before playing a normal-form game. These models are similar to
the construction behind coalitional rationalizability in that coali-
tions can freely form and that binding agreements are not avail-
able. The main difference, besides that only point agreements are
considered, is the assumption that coalitions act publicly and
therefore agreements are publicly observed.
Noncooperative coalitional bargaining considers extensive
form noncooperative games to model n-player coalitional bargain-
ing situations based on characteristic function games (or gener-
alizations of those). These characteristic forms can be derived
from normal-form games, as done in Ray and Vohra [1997, 1999].
The main difference between this approach and the one presented
in this paper is the central assumption in the above papers that
members inside a coalition can make binding agreements, and
only the play among different coalitions occurs in a noncoopera-
tive fashion. The current paper conforms with the tradition of
noncooperative game theory and retains the assumption that
players cannot make any binding agreements.
Rabin’s concept of Consistent Behavioral Theories (see Rabin
[1994b]) can be used to incorporate coalitional reasoning into
normal-form games, and the paper proposes one such theory,
Pareto-focal rationalizability. However, while Rabin’s approach
923 COALITIONAL RATIONALIZABILITYstarts with some exogenously given set of focal points, the proce-
dure in this paper can endogenously explain why certain out-
comes are focal in a game.
There are papers investigating the role of preplay communi-
cation before playing a normal-form game, examining whether it
leads to the type of belief restrictions considered in this paper.
Farrell [1988] assumes that before playing a normal-form game
one player can send a suggestion to the others. This suggestion is
allowed to be a set of strategies, not just a single proﬁle. He points
out that there are games in which players clearly do not want to
make any single-proﬁle agreement, although his considerations
are different than the ones highlighted in this paper. Rabin
[1990] considers assumptions similar to those of Farrell in a
rationalizability setting. Watson [1991] introduces a model in
which one player can suggest playing inside some subset of the
strategy space. The deﬁnition of when this message is credible is
somewhat similar to the deﬁnition of supported restriction, al-
though it is not a generalization of best response strategies.
Furthermore, Watson’s concept is deﬁned only for two-player
games, in which the issues of coalitional agreements are fairly
simple.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In a lot of economic and political situations, subgroups of the
participants have an incentive to coordinate their action choices.
Various coalitional equilibrium concepts were proposed in the
literature that assumed that players with similar interest could
coordinate their play. However, the concepts proposed so far
cannot guarantee existence in a natural class of games. The way
I interpret this is that allowing coalitions to be able to make only
point restrictions (agreements) leads to logical inconsistencies. As
this paper shows, these inconsistencies do not have to arise if one
allows for set-valued restrictions, suggesting that the latter is the
appropriate framework to incorporate coalitional reasoning into
noncooperative game theory.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Let a be such that uj(a)  max
s:sAuj	s
.
Then by the deﬁnition of a supported restriction, aj  Bj @ B such
924 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthat A n B because aj is a best response against aj (it yields the
maximum payoff in Aand AM). Therefore, 
B:BF 	A
Bj  A. This
establishes the claim since j was arbitrary and 
B:BF 	A
B is a
product set. QED
LEMMA 1. Let A  M and A nJ B. Then B  M.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that B  M. Then ?j, aj and fj
such that j  J, aj  Aj/Bj, fj  j(B) and aj  BRj( fj),
which contradicts A nJ B. QED
LEMMA 2. Let A nJ B, and let C be such that C  M, C  A and
C  B  0. Then C nJ(C  B).
Proof of Lemma 2. Lemma 1 and C  M imply that B  M.
Then C  B  M by the deﬁnition of a set closed under rational
behavior. Let j and cj be such that j  J and cj  Cj/Bj. Note that
A nJ B implies that uj(cj,fj)  uj(bj,gj), @bj, fj, gj such
that fj  * j(A/B)  j(A), cj  BRj( fj), gj  j(B),
bj  BRj(gj) and gj
J  f j
J, @sJ  SJ. But since C  A and
C  B  B, this implies that uj(cj,fj)  uj(bj,gj), @bj, fj, gj
such that fj  * j((C  B))  j(C), cj  BRj( fj), gj 
j(C  B), bj  BRj(gj) and gj
J  f j
J, @sJ  SJ.
Since this holds for every j and cj such that j  J and cj  Cj/Bj,
(C) nJ (C  B). QED
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 1, B  M, and C
i  M
@i  1 ,...,k. By Proposition 1, B  C
1  A. Then by Lemma
2, C
1 nJ
B (B  C
1). Now suppose that C
n nJ
B (B  C
n) for some
1  n  k  1. Then by deﬁnition B  C
n  A. Then Proposition
1, C
n nJ
B (B  C
n), and C
n nJ
n C
n1 imply that B  C
n1 
A. Then Lemma 2 implies that C
n1 nJ
B (B  C
n1). The claim
follows by induction. QED
Proof of Proposition 3. Since S is ﬁnite and A
k1  A
k, @k 
1, the second part of the claim is immediate. Note that A
0  S 
M. Now assume that A
k  M for some k  0. By Proposition 1,
A
k1  A. By Lemma 2, A
k1 can be reached from A
k by a
sequence of supported restrictions, and then by Proposition 2,
A
k1  M. By induction, A
k  A, and A
k  M, @k  0. Since
A*  A
k whenever k  K, this implies that A*  A and A*  M.
Now suppose that there exists a nontrivial supported restric-
tion given A*. Since A*  A
K, this implies that there is a
925 COALITIONAL RATIONALIZABILITYnontrivial supported restriction given A
K, which contradicts
that A
K1  A
K. QED
Proof of Proposition 4. This proof follows from the fact that
for a single-player coalition {i}, requirement 2 in the deﬁnition of
supported restriction is equivalent to requiring that there are no
si and fi such that si  Bi/Ai, fi  i(A) and si 
BRi( fi). QED
Proof of Proposition 5. Since the sequence of sets (B
k)k0
 is
nested and S is ﬁnite, there is L  0 such that B
k  B
L, @k 
L. Since B
0  S, B
0  M. Now assume that B
k  M for some
k  0. By Proposition 1, 
B:BF 	Bk
B  A,s oB
k1
 
B:BkB  A. By Lemmas 1 and 2, B
k1  M. Since B
k  B
L,
@k  L, by deﬁnition of the sequence (B
k)k0
 there is no nontrivial
supported restriction given B
L.
By deﬁnition B
L  A
0. Note that by Lemma 2 and Proposi-
tion 2 B
L can be reached from A
0 by a sequence of supported
restrictions. Then by Lemma 1 B
L  M. Therefore, by Proposi-
tion 2 A
0 n B implies that B
L n B
L  B. Then since there is no
nontrivial supported restriction given B
L, B
L  A
1. Then by
Lemma 2 B
L can be reached from A
1 by a sequence of supported
restrictions. An inductive argument shows that B
L  A
k, @k  0,
and therefore B
L  A*. A symmetric argument establishes that
A*  B
k, @k  0, and therefore A*  B
L. QED
LEMMA 3. Let A be such that A*  A and A  A*. Then
A* 
B:BF 	 A
B.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose not. Then there are B  A and J 
I such that A nJ B and A*  B. First, consider B  A*  A. Then
by Lemma 2, A* nJ (B  A*), contradicting that there is no non-
trivial supported restriction given A*.
Now consider B  A*  A. Then there is k  0 such that B 
A
k  A and B  A
k1  A. As established above, A
k  M. Together
with A  M this implies that A  A
k  M, because for any i  I and
any fi  i(A  A
k), BRi(fi)  A since A  M and BRi(fi)  A
k
since A
k  M,s oBRi(fi)  A  A
k. Since A nJ B, by Proposition
2, (A  A
k) nJ (B  A
k). Furthermore, since A  A
k1  A (they
both contain A*), (A  A
k) nJ (A  C) @C  F (A
k). The above
implies that 
C:CF 	AAk
  	A  A
k1
  	B  A
k
. But (B  A
k) 
(A  A
k1)  B  A
k1  A, contradicting Proposition 1. QED
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Then 
B:BF 	 A
B  A.
Proof of Lemma 4. There exists k  0 such that A  A
k and
A  A
k1. Then there are B  A and J  I such that A
k nJ B
and A  B  A. Note that A
k nJ B implies A
k1  B which in
turn implies A*  B. Therefore, A  A*  A implies that A 
B  A. Furthermore, A
k nJ B implies that A  M, which
together with A  M and A  B  A implies that A  B  M.
Then by Lemma 2 A nJ (A  B), so 
B:BF 	 A
B  A. QED
Proof of Proposition 6. Lemmas 3 and 4 establish that A*i s
externally coalitionally stable. Proposition 3 establishes that A*i s
internally coalitionally stable. By Lemma 4, if A is such that A/A* 
A and A  A*  A, then A cannot be coalitionally stable. If A/A* 
A, then A  A*, in which case either A  A*o rA cannot be
coalitionally stable, since A* contains it and there is no nontrivial
supported restriction given A*. And if A  A*  A, then there is
k  0 such that A  A
k and A  A
k1. Therefore, A is not
coalitionally stable, since A  A
k and A 
B:BF 	 Ak
B. QED
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that s* is a pure strategy
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and s*  A*. Then there is k 
0 such that s*  A
k but s*  A
k1. That implies that there is
J  I and B  A such that A
k nJ B and s*  B. Let s be a
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of G[BJ  s* I/J]. The starting
assumption guarantees the existence of such proﬁle s. Note that
for every j  J it holds that s j is a best response against a
conjecture that allocates probability 1 to s j, and that s* j is a best
response against a conjecture that allocates probability 1 to s* j.
This implies that uj(s)  uj(s*), @j  J because B is a sup-
ported restriction by J given A
k. Therefore, s is a proﬁtable
coalitional deviation from s*b yJ. Suppose now that there is a
credible proﬁtable coalitional deviation s from s by J  J. The
credibility of this deviation implies that for every j  J, s j is a
best response against the belief that allocates probability 1 to s j.
Consider ﬁrst the case that s j  Aj
k, @j  J. Since s is a
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of G[BJ  s* I/J], it can only be
that s i  Bi for some i  J. But then the proﬁtability of this
deviation implies that ui(s)  ui(s), contradicting A
k nJ B,
since i  J  J. Next consider the case that s j  Aj
k for some j 
J. Let m  0 be such that s j  Aj
m, @j  J, but there is i  J
such that s i  Ai
m1. Note that m  k since s j  Aj
k. Then there
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m such that A
m nL C and s i  Ci. But
the proﬁtability of the above deviation implies that ui(s) 
ui(s), contradicting A
m nL C. This establishes that s is a
credible proﬁtable deviation from s*b yJ since there is no
credible proﬁtable deviation from it by a subcoalition of J. This
contradicts that s* is a pure strategy coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium. QED
Proof of Proposition 8. Let Ai  suppi, @i  I, and let
A 
iI Ai. Suppose that A  A*. Then there is k  0 such
that A  A
k, but A  A
k1. This implies that there are B  A
k
and J  I such that B is a supported restriction by J given A
k,
and A  B. Let L  {jj  J, ?sj such that sj  Aj and sj  Bj}.
For every l  L, let al be such that al  Al and al  Bl. For every
l  L, let fl be the conjecture of player l corresponding to the
others playing the proﬁle l:fl	sl

iI/li	si
. Note that al 
BRl( fl), @l  L. Now let GL be the truncated game in which the
set of players are L, the set of strategies are Bl, l  L, and the
payoff functions are g ˆ l(sL)  gl(sL,L). Since its strategy sets
are compact and payoff functions are continuous, GL has a Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies. Let  ˆ
L be such a proﬁle. Since
B  M by Lemma 1, for every l  L,  ˆ
l is a best response against
the proﬁle ( ˆ
L/l,L). Then since B is a supported restriction by J
given C, ul( ˆ
L,L)  ul(al,l)  ul(). But that implies  ˆ
L is
a proﬁtable deviation for L from , contradicting that  is a strong
Nash equilibrium. QED
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